On his blog “French Politics,” Arthur Goldhammer remarks on the appointment of Claude Sérillon to help with “public relations”:

“François Hollande has apparently decided that his PR operation needs shoring up, so he has brought in Claude Sérillon, a newsman who anchored a prime time broadcast in the ’80s, to advise him on such matters. We’ll see what changes this brings. The problem is that Hollande’s initial coup de comm’ was to characterize himself as a president who would favor substance over framing, the long game over winning the news cycle, and a vision of governance as a collective rather than an individual effort. Perhaps Sérillon can find a way to dramatize these values, but their appeal lies precisely in their being undramatic, even anti-dramatic, but ultimately more effective than cheap histrionics. No doubt Hollande is disappointed that what he takes to be his quiet virtues have not been sufficiently recognized, but can he enhance their appeal by selling them a little more vociferously?”

I think this is not such a bad move by Hollande. His approval ratings are in free fall and he clearly needs to change something and improving the way in which he communicates with the people is essential no matter what other choices he makes. If he continues to simply sit like a bump on a log, he needs to sell that to the French people as the wisest course of action (in inaction, as the case may be).

Perhaps, as an added bonus, M. Sérillon can work with Hollande on being more decisive and forceful in imposing himself and his policies on his government and elsewhere.

There is another, more serious point to be made about this. The implication of Goldhammer’s post is that by reaching out to Claude Sérillon, Hollande is choosing framing over substance. I think that’s right. Yet, it is hard to see what else Hollande can do to improve his situation if he isn’t willing to take some risks and ruffle some feathers.

I have been thinking back over a number of exchanges between myself and Arthur Goldhammer since Hollande’s election and it seems to me that in largely talking past one another we have inadvertently described Hollande’s dilemma. I have regularly counseled bold action. For example, I have advocated that Hollande demand that the ECB function as a normal central bank and that he demand abandonment of radical austerity in favor of stimulus and growth. I have said that he should leave the euro or even break with the EU if his demands are refused (and many other actions which I won’t catalog).

Goldhammer and others have often responded by arguing that Hollande has very limited freedom of action. He is hemmed in by German power at the ECB and other EU institutions; he is constrained by the reality that he can’t print more euros in the way that French governments could print more francs and he is constrained by a government which seems to consist of a very loose alliance of barons over whom he has limited control; there is no support among the other leaders for a move against Germany; this treaty or that treaty says he can’t do what I advocate and so forth.

Regrettably, it occurs to me that M. Goldhammer and I are both right. Hollande is like the gingerbread man who can’t run until he gets hot but can’t get hot unless he runs. He seems constrained from doing what is necessary to save France, yet he’s also unwilling even to try to free himself from those constraints.

I think my advise is correct because if Hollande does nothing, France will suffer greatly and so will the PS at the next election. On the other hand, Goldhammer is right that Hollande’s is constrained in all of these many ways. And if it’s true that these constraints prevent him from doing what’s necessary to get France out of this mess and the chains are unbreakable then Hollande is probably finished, no matter what.

I think Hollande needs to at least fight the good fight. As things stand now, he’s really got nothing to lose and the world to gain. If he can’t or won’t fight for the policies he has said are necessary, where else can he turn but to the dark art of public relations?

It doesn’t matter much whether you hang yourself here or somewhere else, if you’re going to hang yourself anyway.

Georges Brassens, Je Me Suis Fait Tout Petit, 1957

On the whole, I have always agreed with Georges Brassens that if one must hang, the details are unimportant because the result is the same anyway. However, in the case of Cyprus, a country that will soon face the rope, there maybe nothing that will save that country from enduring terrible pain today but there are choices available that can make a big difference for the future of the Cypriot people.  In this case, I agree with Paul Krugman that since Cyprus will suffer anyway, they should leave the euro now.
 Regardless of whether an agreement is reached that staves off the immediate disaster, it seems inevitable that Cyprus is in for a long period of terrible suffering. In other words, Cyprus is screwed. This part of its fate is inevitable.

But if Cyprus chooses wisely it can severely limit this suffering and emerge from this crisis in a better position for the long-term growth of its economy and a better future for the people.
 The island will soon undergo the sort of economic collapse and all of the pain that is said to have made joining the euro an irrevocable decision. If Cyprus remains in the euro zone, it will suffer under a regime of murderous austerity for a period of several years, perhaps as long as several decades. We see the results of such austerity in Greece today, where the country’s historical heritage is being systematically looted and the people are being crucified on the cross of artificial gold called the euro.
 Greek families are being impoverished and destroyed. Entire communities devastated.

Today, there is hunger and abject poverty like that of the third world in a member state of the European Union, something we would have thought laughable only a few years ago. It will probably take decades for Greece to catch up to what it was before the crisis, perhaps it never will.
 This is not necessarily the fate of Cyprus. If Cyprus leaves the euro, Cypriots may be spared the worst. There may be positive short term effects, too.   For example, devaluation will surely make the country more attractive for tourism, which is its main industry anyway. Exports will become more competitive and the economic pain shared more widely and equitably in society.

Clearly, the immediate fate of Cyprus is already written. But if they will hang anyway, why not get something out of it? That is why I urge the Cypriot people to act now and act boldly for a better future for their country. Yes, today’s generation will be hanged by the bankers and the Troika, but they have a golden opportunity to lay the foundation for a renaissance of the Cypriot economy. Cyprus must leave the euro. The grandchildren and great-grandchildren of today’s Cypriots will thank them.